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Abstract: 
Mongolia’s unbroken record of a quarter-century of democracy was confirmed in its 7th parliament 
elections in 2016. It produced an overwhelming victory to the former communist party MPP and 
resulted in the fourth turn over since the break with Communism. International observers applaud 
the efficient administration of the elections. Compared with countries in East and Southeast Asia, 
Mongolia is top of the form even that structural conditions stack against this. Malpractices do 
characterize the elections, but this has not hindered a positive development in institutions. Four 
governments have accepted electoral defeat, two presidents up for reelection likewise, oversized 
governments are formed in times of political crisis but one-party control of the government and 
presidency is not used to corrupt power and checks and balances between the president and 
parliament are healthy. This paper analyses electoral integrity in Mongolia compared to other East 
and Southeast Asia regimes to better understand how democracy works in Mongolia in and between 
elections. The analysis suggests that a notion of tolerance and compromise based on strong 
institutional underpinnings seems to spur a structured interaction between opposition parties and 
political elites respect for democratic rules. 
 
Key words: Mongolia, electoral integrity, semi-presidentialism, Third wave, East and Southeast 
Asia 
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Electoral malpractice is a dominant phenomenon in East and Southeast Asian. Mongolia is top of 
the class. Whereas political elites in Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and a handful of other East and 
Southeast Asian countries sidestep electoral rights and practices to stay in power, incumbents in 
Mongolia respect these, even in positions where power could be corrupted unrestricted. Notably, 
four periods of one-party control in the legislature and executive office have not tempted political 
elites to corrupt power, an incumbent government party has handed over power to the winning 
opposition four times during Mongolia’s seven parliament elections, two presidents up for re-
elections have stepped down upon defeat at the ballot boxes, four oversized government coalitions 
have been formed in times of political crisis, and presidential or parliamentary vetoes have been 
used but not misused or disrespected. This paper seeks to shed light on the nature of Mongolia’s 
remarkable institutional resilience and how it affects interaction between key political actors.  
 The governance style of elections in Mongolia reflects trends in many democracies, 
particularly in East and Southeast Asia and Latin America. Similar to countries in East and 
Southeast Asia – but unlike many countries outside this region – Mongolia has not abandoned all 
elements of the majoritarian electoral systems and opted for a ‘full’ proportional based system. 
Mongolia did introduce a proportional element to its electoral system in 2011 that was used only in 
the parliamentarian elections in 2012. On the contrary, electoral reforms in Mongolia – as in many 
other countries in East and Southeast Asia – are confined to changes to electoral rules, district 
magnitude or voting structure within the original institutional arrangement (Hicken 2004). Similar 
to examples of electoral governance in democracies and newly transited regimes in Latin America, 
rule changes in Mongolia tend to reflect the preferences of the incumbent government party (Diaz-
Cayeros and Magaloni 2001; McElwain 2008; Remmer 2008), but the changes have often back-
fired and led to landslide victories to the opposition. Mongolia’s progress on electoral integrity is 
best characterized as a ‘one-step-back-two-steps-forward’ kind. Changes to core electoral 
3 
 
institutions in Mongolia have not been elegant, sometimes bordering malpractice, but they have 
paradoxically contributed to maintain democratic rule, where political parties have structured 
interaction and political elites respect the limits of democratic rule.  
This paper seeks to unravel institutional underpinnings of electoral democracy in 
Mongolia, by building on Huntington’s work on political institutions and organizations in society 
and the proliferating literature on Electoral Integrity (see, e.g., Elklit and Reynolds 2005; Norris 
2004, 2015). It focuses on institutions – rules of the game – regulating the access to power (e.g., 
electoral laws and the Electoral Management Body) and institutions regulating the exercise of 
power (e.g., the constitutional framework) (Mazzuca 2010).  
The analysis shows how elements in the constitutional framework and the functioning 
of core electoral institutions have promoted power sharing as well as checks and balances in the 
political system and a political culture of tolerance has proliferated that imbues political opponents’ 
interaction in and between elections, where crisis is tempered through dialogue and intentions of 
getting things to work. Ultimately, it seeks to identify institutional underpinnings that bolster 
democratic regimes in countries with moderate levels of socio-economic development.  
To understand how electoral institutions and the constitutional framework have 
contributed to stable party competition and political elites’ sanction of democratic rule, the paper 
first flesh out Mongolia’s electoral democracy in numbers and figures and based on these motivates 
Mongolia as a least likely case of electoral integrity. Second, the paper discussed the concept of 
electoral integrity. Third, it examines rules and practices structuring access to power and exercise of 
power in Mongolia’s seven elections for parliament. Fourth, the paper assesses institutional 
underpinnings of stable party competition and checks and balances. Finally, the paper concludes 
and explores the implications of the findings for Mongolia’s electoral competition and the broader 
literature on democratic transition and consolidation.  
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Mongolia – top of the form 
Squeezed in between two authoritarian behemoths, citizens in Mongolia live on average on 10 
dollars a day. Mongolia’s Buddhist, ethnic homogeneous and small population were under de facto 
Soviet rule from 1921 to 1989 and subsequently experienced one of the most massive economic 
downturns following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Citizens’ found economic safety in the 
traditional nomadic life style and a recent boom in mining has created impressive economic growth 
rates.  
Mongolia has held seven elections for parliament and the presidency, respectively. 
International observers have continuously praised Mongolia for its sound and clean elections (The 
International Republican Institute 2000, 2008, OSCE/ODIHR EOM Mongolia 2013, 2016, 2017; 
see also Enkhbaatar et al. 2016, 136–37). Mongolia – together with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, 
Indonesia and Singapore – comes out markedly better on V-DEM’s clean elections index than the 
rest of East and Southeast Asia (see Table 1 in the appendix).  
If we broaden out the conception of democracy to include Dahls notion of respect for 
freedom rights and civil liberties, Mongolia again is top of the form. Scores on the V-DEM 
project’s Polyarchy index indicate that Mongolia does well compared to other East and Southeast 
Asian regimes and has done so since the first democratic election in 1992 (numbers are reported in 
Table 2 in the appendix). Other than the two usual suspects, Japan and South Korea, only Indonesia 
and Taiwan have since the late 1990s matched Mongolia on respect for political rights and civil 
liberties in East and Southeast Asia (cf. Dahl 1971). Recently, Mongolia and South Korea have 
come on pair in their scorings on the index.  
Every year since 1989, Freedom House identifies what they perceive as electoral 
democracies. In 2016, they put Mongolia (since 1992) in the class of electoral democracy together 
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with Indonesia, Japan, Philippines South Korea and Taiwan. This has been a stable pattern since 
Indonesia joined the league in 1999. The only other country that has qualified for this class of 
regimes is Thailand (the periods 1989-1990, 1992-2005 and 2011-2013). 
Other than these expert scorings, citizens in Mongolia express remarkable support for 
democracy as the best form of government. Asked by the Asia Barometer for the fourth time since 
2002, more than 4 out of 5 Mongolians agree that “democracy may have its problems, but it is still 
the best form of government”. Throughout the four waves of survey, at least three out of five 
Mongolians agree with this notion.
 1
 In the fourth wave of surveys, other electoral democracies, 
such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia scores slightly higher than Mongolia and the 
Philippines slightly lower. Somewhat surprisingly, support for the authoritarian regimes in 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand is stronger among citizens than support for the regime 
in Mongolia (Pan and Wu 2017, 6).  
Mongolians do also participate in the democratic system. Throughout its seven 
elections for parliament, Mongolia has seen a persistently high voter turnout. It peaked in 1992, 
where 95.6 per cent of registered voters participated, have since declined to reach a low point in 
2012 on 65.2 per cent and went up to 73.6 per cent in the most recent 2016-elections out of the little 
more than 2 million registered voters. 
Mongolia do indeed punch above its weight on electoral integrity (Norris 2015, 14). 
Mongolia scores “high” on the so-called Perception of Electoral Integrity index (Norris and 
Grömping 2017). The index is calculated on the basis of 49 core items that takes into account 
electoral procedures, boundaries, voter and party registration, campaign media and financing, 
voting process, vote count, post-election and electoral authorities. The 2016-scoring covers the 
period from 1 July 2012 to 31 December 2016, including the elections for presidency in 2013 and 
                                                 
1
 Asian Barometer, Wave 4 Survey, online at http://www.asianbarometer.org/survey/wave4-mongolia (consulted 17-08-
17). 
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the parliament in 2016. Mongolia ranks in the 72
nd
 percentile on the index (ranks 45 out of 158 
countries). Mongolia is in the league of countries with “high electoral integrity” (scoring between 
60 and 69 on the 100 point scale) together with United States and Japan, a handful of long-standing 
Latin American (Brazil, Chile, Peru and Argentine) and European democracies (the UK, France, 
Italy, Greece) and a few countries outside the Global North West (Tunisia, Benin, Ghana, South 
Africa, Namibia and Bhutan) including a number of smaller island states. A “very high” score (70+) 
on the index is given mostly to countries in the global North West.  
Compared to East and Southeast Asia, Mongolia ranks fourth after Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan. Together with Indonesia – another top of the form achiever – Mongolia scores 
markedly above Myanmar, Cambodia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam 
(scores on sub-dimension of the Electoral Integrity index are reported in Table 3 in the appendix). 
Overall, Mongolia scores 64, and does particularly well on the dimensions of vote count (scoring 
88), where it scores markedly better than Japan, Indonesia and the Philippines. On electoral 
authorities (71), Mongolia is on Japan’s heels and markedly better than Indonesia and the 
Philippines and the group of authoritarian regimes. Mongolia also does well on electoral procedures 
(73) and results (73) – markedly better than Indonesia and the Philippines, but on level with 
Singapore, Myanmar and Laos (the latter only on ‘results’). Mongolia scores worse on the 
dimensions relating to campaign financing (43), electoral laws (53), media coverage (55) and 
district boundaries (57). Campaign financing and media coverage is not so surprising considering 
that those areas are also severely challenging in all of the other East and South East Asian countries 
and even in long-standing democracies in the global North West. The emphasis on these dimensions 
will, thus, be downplayed in the analysis. Those numbers form the backdrop of the analysis of 
essential factors in the core functioning of electoral democracy in Mongolia.  
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Electoral integrity in Mongolia 
There are good reasons to focus on elections. Elections are the bedrock of democratic 
accountability, the arena in which basic democratic rules structures the vertical interaction between 
political actors and citizens, where citizens – and opposition parties – can be empowered to “throw 
the rascals out” if they are dissatisfied by unpopular leadership, and the horizontal interaction 
between political actors, namely political parties (Norris 2015, 4). Electoral malpractice undermines 
the functioning of these imperative mechanisms.  
Pippa Norris (2015) presents three strains of scholarship that focuses on how to explain 
variation in electoral integrity. Socio-economic development and international engagement are 
prominent perspectives in works that seeks to account for variation in electoral integrity (Norris 
2015, chapter 3 and 4). But Mongolia’s status as a least likely case rules out the explanatory 
leverage of these two perspectives. This paper takes up a third perspective suggested by Norris that 
emphasizes power-sharing vested in check and balances of the political system. This area of 
research has received far less systematic attention than the two other perspectives. It has primary 
focus on the institutions that governs elections, which includes the overall constitutional framework, 
and the more particular agencies that regulates governance of elections in each country (Norris 
2015, 21).  
This paper seeks to understand how power-sharing and checks and balances built into the 
constitutional framework and core electoral institutions on the one hand curbs political actors – and 
especially the governing party’s – abuse of power and manipulation of the electoral rules and 
practices and on the other hand affects stable competition between political parties and political 
elites sanction of democratic rule more in general (Norris 2015, 21).  
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Constitutional arrangements provide the broadest context of electoral integrity – e.g. type of 
regime, electoral and party systems, role and powers of the legislature and executive and the 
independence of the courts and judiciary (Norris 2015, 21). These entities can spur power-sharing in 
politics that build stakeholder trust, reduce the incentives for malpractice and provide checks and 
balances countering the potential abuse of power of political elites (Norris 2015, 113–14).  
Core administrative agencies – usually referred to as electoral management bodies (EMB) – 
exercise authority directly over the implementation of electoral laws and procedures. Central 
questions are whether EMBs are designed to be effective in strengthening the quality of elections; if 
the parliament is strong and effective enough to act as an important collective oversight agency; if 
actors in civil society can link citizens and the state, including if notably the independent media and 
watchdog organizations of domestic observers can strengthen accountability and transparency of 
electoral authorities that in turn strengthens electoral integrity (Norris 2015, 21–22).  
Moreover, this study is mostly interested in the mechanical effects of electoral rules that 
regulates how candidates are elected to parliament and which partiers enter government i.e. the 
effects that flow directly from the electoral rules and the structural conditions in which such 
relationships vary in a consistent manner at the macro-level (Norris 2004, 23) – more than 
measuring the psychological effects of how electoral rules alter the behavior of political actors 
(parties and politicians) and citizens (Norris 2004, 5–6). 
Unlike other regimes in East and Southeast Asian countries (referred to as ESEA 
countries), changes to the electoral system in Mongolia have not taken the form of electoral 
malpractice that characterizes situations, where basic democratic rules of the game are sidestepped. 
Sarah Birch defines electoral malpractice as “the manipulation of electoral processes and outcomes 
so as to substitute personal or partisan benefit for the public interest” (2011, 12). Governance of 
elections is played out within the democratic rules. But the changes have not been intended to 
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improve democratic accountability, representation or management of ethnic tensions, or enhance 
civic engagement – what Norris refers to as electoral engineering (2004, 15). Governance of 
electoral rules in Mongolia lies somewhere in between malpractice perceived as the opposite of 
integrity and engineering that can both be intended to undermine or improve democratic rule. Some 
recent changes to electoral rules in Mongolia comes dangerously close to electoral malpractice, but 
have – so far – remained within the domain of democratic rule.  
The analysis is based on the premise that actors in the elections can accept some, but not 
too much overt attempts of electoral malpractice. But the question is if electoral credibility survives. 
There will always be some margin of error as it is difficult to envisage any large-scale operation 
such as a national election not being occasionally infected by defective ballots, incomplete voter 
registers, inaccuracies in counting, impersonation and other blemishes. Human error happens 
sometimes, but if these errors are random and do not accumulate to determining the outcome of the 
election, then electoral credibility survives, which is exactly why these credible routines themselves 
tend to obscure how important electoral governance is (Elklit and Reynolds 2005, 148). The major 
question is when enough malpractice is enough. It is tricky to nail down a line of demarcation, 
because in some cases, failures arise through happenstance, in others they are intentional and it is 
difficult to know it when we see it (Norris 2015, 3). Elklit and Reynolds help us draw this line by 
pointing to essential factors in an electoral process that promotes integrity and ultimately bolsters 
democratic rule.  
Elklit and Reynolds (2005) framework is an operational and empirically oriented approach 
that enables scholars to assess electoral integrity systematically and specifically how electoral 
institutions underpin structured interaction between political actors, such as political parties and 
elites. The framework looks at process, before, during and after elections to get the full picture of 
election quality, and specifically to better capture changes to the electoral playing field that can be 
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undermined by subtle forms of irregularities in as well de jure as de facto ways, and take 
qualitatively steps up and down on several dimensions over time (Elklit and Reynolds 2005, 149). 
Elklit and Reynolds’ identify 11 such steps, which an Electoral Management Body (EMB) 
usually has responsibility for carrying out. These steps ranges from the initial legal framework to 
the closing post-election procedures, including districting; voter education; registration; the 
regulation and design of the ballot; polling and counting, along with some broader areas such as 
campaign regulation, complaints procedures and the implementation of election results (Elklit and 
Reynolds 2005, 151). 
Not all steps are equally important for the core functioning of elections. If some essential 
steps fail, they cause the breakdown of the entire election process. They can help us identify when 
benevolent engineering turns into malevolent malpractice. The essential steps are legal framework, 
election management, access to the ballot, polling, counting the vote and post-election procedures 
for resolving disputes (Elklit and Reynolds 2005, 154). These dimensions mirror the PEI sub-
dimensions, where Mongolia stood out in comparison to other ESEA countries. The next sections 
examine Mongolia’s electoral integrity on each of the core dimension in turn compared to other 
ESEA countries. 
 
Legal framework 
The legal framework of elections in Mongolia has generally assured that elections have been held 
without extra-legislative delay to the legislative and executive bodies. However, last minute 
changes to the electoral law in 2016 made it difficult for the EMB to implement the new legislation 
on time. The electoral framework is broadly perceived to be legitimate, but the changes made to the 
law just two months before the 2016-elections were received with deep concern among non-state 
actors and the international community. It was not so much the radical changes of the electoral law 
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that is alarming, but the timing of the changes. We have seen countries in the West do radical 
changes as well – France, e.g., moved back and forth between majoritarian and proportional 
elections in the postwar era and during the 1990s New Zealand, Israel, Venezuela, Italy, and Japan 
have all implemented major reforms (Norris 2004, 22). Table 4 maps the electoral system in 
Mongolia’s seven elections for the parliament.  
 
Table 4: Overview of electoral systems used for elections to Parliament in Mongolia, 1992-2016.  
Year 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
System 
MMD  
(block vote) 
SMD SMD SMD 
MMD  
(block vote) 
Mixed  
MMD / SMD 
SMD 
Notes: ‘MMD’ is abbreviation for multi-member district system and ‘SMD’ is abbreviation for 
single-member district system. 
 
 
Until 2011, changes to Mongolia’s legislative framework of elections were within the family of the 
majoritarian system. The first democratic elections in 1992 used the rare block vote, where voters 
cast between 2 and 4 votes in each of the 26 district depending on the district size. This system is 
known to exaggerate the first-past-the-post bias towards the biggest parties, because voters have a 
tendency to cast all of their votes on candidates from one of the biggest parties (Elklit 1994). The 
elections in 1996, 2000 and 2004 used a pure single-member district system to elect the 76 
members of parliament.  
In 2008, the election system was changed back to the block vote. Discontent with the 
outcome resulted in post-election violence with 5 casualties and hundreds of injured. This incidence 
forced the major parties to get together and find compromise on a gentler and kindler system that 
could remedy similar political crisis in future elections. A proportional element was introduced to 
the majoritarian system in which 28 out of 76 mandates are distributed proportional to political 
parties’ based on their countrywide vote share on a closed party list. The remaining 48 seats are 
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filled on the basis of a plurality vote in 26 districts with district magnitudes ranging from 1 to 3 
mandates. Moreover, a 30 per cent gender quota was introduced for political parties’ candidate lists.  
The result of the 2012-election brought out the intended amendments of the electoral law 
in 2011. The proportional element awarded a third party significant representation for the first time 
(the newly formed MPRP won 11 seats) and the gender quota resulted in 11 seats for women. 
Moreover, the proportional element awarded additional 5 women a seat.  
The election law has to be enacted by parliament 6 month prior to every election. After an 
involving process that, e.g., included public hearings, the parliament approved the law in December 
2015, 6 month prior to the most recent parliament elections in June 2016. Contrary to previous 
approvals of the electoral laws, a clause hindering further amendments to the law less than 6 month 
before the election was left out. The parliament, thus, opened a loop hole for further changes. 
Moreover, it put a ban on publishing voting polls before the elections.  
The constitutional court approved the electoral law in 2011 and 2015, but in April 2016, 
the court ruled that the proportional element of the electoral system was unconstitutional because it 
did not fulfill citizen’s rights to directly elect their representatives. This followed the parliament’s 
dismissal of the chief judge of the high court, J. Amarsanaa, in February 2016 for a minor 
procedural misbehavior.
2
  
Even though no law requires parliament to take action on the courts’ rulings at any given 
time, it only took the parliament two weeks to put the court’s ruling into a new sweepingly amended 
electoral law. On 5 May 2016 – less than two months before the elections – the parliament utilized 
that the clause barring further changes to the electoral law was left out and changed the electoral 
system back to a pure single-member-district system. The ban on publishing voting polling was 
lifted, but too late for polling bureaus to get funding for producing any results; the gender quota was 
                                                 
2
 J. Amarsanaa had expressed his opinions directly to the Prime Minister instead of via a unanimously supported letter 
from the entire high court to parliament. 
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lowered from 30 to 20 per cent; the deadline for delineating election districts reduced from 150 days 
to 45 days prior to the election day and citizens living abroad were repealed from voting, thus, 
leaving a 150,000 diaspora citizens unable to participating in the elections. The amendment left a 
huge burden of work on the General Election Commission (GEC). To address concerns over the 
counting machines’ accuracy and integrity, the amendment to the law stipulated that up to 50 per 
cent of polling stations would be subject to manual recounts. The procedures stipulating the manual 
re-count, however, were only finalized two days before the election. Yet, the electoral engineering 
had the complete opposite effect than the incumbent government party, DP had intended. The MPP 
(the former communist party, MPRP) won a landslide victory and reduced the government party, 
DP to a spectator in parliament.  
A somewhat similar move was made in 1995, when the government majority party, MPRP 
gave in on pressure from the opposition and introduced a proportional element to the majoritarian 
based electoral system. The new electoral law stipulated that 24 out of the total 76 seat were 
transferred to proportional representation, while the system maintained a simple majority vote for 
the remaining 52 seats. Nonetheless, in January 1996, MPRP singlehandedly amended the electoral 
law to remove the elements of proportional representation, despite strong protests from the 
president and opposition. In the June 1996 parliament elections, a coalition of opposition parties 
nonetheless won a landslide victory despite the incumbent party’s attempt to favor its own position. 
Taken together, there have been frequent, significant changes to the electoral system. This 
goes against best-practice. New system should at least be in place for three consecutive elections to 
give the institution time to “settle in”, show good and bad sides and to give journalist, candidates 
and voters time to get used to how the new system works (Taagepera 1997, 58). The rather fluid 
electoral system has, however, not hindered a positive development in core electoral institutions 
that has underscored the emergence of a structure interaction between key actors in the political 
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system. This hints at an underlying modus vivendi that proceeds even that institutions and practices 
work against it.  
 
Election management, including count of votes 
The perceived degree of the General Election Commission impartiality is high among parties and 
voters. It delivers high-quality services during elections and its conduct of actions is transparent 
(OSCE/ODIHR EOM Mongolia 2013, 2016, 2017). The commission partners with 10 civil society 
organizations to improve quality of elections, such as the Voter Education center to make voter 
education prior to the elections; the Mongolian Information Development Association (MIDAS) on 
developing and testing the automatic counting machines; the Mongolian National Federation of the 
Blind (MNFB) to implement Braille ballot covers and magnifying lenses and access for all to 
polling stations and voting booths, and with Open Society Forum to deploy 260 independent 
observers to polling stations all over the country.  
The use of automatic counting machines implemented after the turbulent 2008 elections 
raises confidence of the result. Vote counts are sent electronically and also called in and it enables 
the GEC to announce the result on the Election Day – a factor that otherwise might have 
contributed to the unrest after the 2008-elections for parliament, where the counting dragged on and 
led to discontent. Mongolian authorities as well as international observers have expressed that the 
technology produces results with accuracy, integrity and reliability. The results of manual recounts 
in the 2016-elections were similar to the machine results. The counting system is an enabling factor 
in raising confidence in the work of the GEC.   
Also the current composition of GEC builds trust among key stakeholders and voters, more 
than the composition during the first four elections for parliament. In the first elections in 1992, the 
GEC consisted of 15 members drawn from the former communist party, MRPR. During the 1996-
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2000 period when MPRP was in opposition, one candidate from the opposition was selected. Until 
2001, the other 14 MPRP-affiliated members had their 5 year mandate renewed twice. In 2000, 
MPRP chaired GEC, and also 50 out of the 76 electoral district committees (15 out of 20 in the 
capital, Ulaanbaataar). No by-laws regulated the business of the GEC and all its meetings were 
closed to the press and the public. In 2001, the number of members was reduced to 11.  
In 2006, a new Law on the General Election Commission of Mongolia was adopted 
establishing the commission we know today with nine members that serve for 6 year terms.
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Generally speaking, the current selection and appointment procedures of the GECs Chief 
Commissioner and Commissioners are perceived to be transparent (Enkhbaatar et al. 2016, 70). The 
Commissions members are all appointed by the Parliament, but nominated by different bodies: the 
Parliament’s Standing Committee on State Structure nominates 5 members, the President nominates 
2 members, and the Supreme Court nominates 2 civil servants to be members. Members are drawn 
from civil servants, who have documented prior electoral experience (they must have a valid 
training certificate issued by the GEC). The chairman and secretary are appointed from among the 
nine members based on recommendations by the Chairman of the Parliament. Appointments from 
different branches of the state builds a check and balance mechanism into the electoral system, and 
enhance confidence in the credibility of members that together with the partnership with civil 
society and supportive technology strengthens confidence in the GEC by political elites and citizens 
at large.  
However, there are irregularities at the lower level of the GEC. There are 26 Territorial 
Election Commissions (TEC) with 11 members each. 2008-numbers provided by the GEC indicate 
that the two major parties, DP and MPP have equally strong representation in the TECs.
4
 They are 
                                                 
3
 http://gec.gov.mn/en/index.php?page=chronicle (consulted 17-08-17). 
4
 In the 2008-parliament elections, there were 286 members of TECs nationwide out of which 100 represented DP and 
92 represented MPRP (IRI, 2008: 17).  
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all chaired by persons directly subordinated to political officials at the regional level, which signals 
lack of impartiality. After the 2016-parliament elections, 76 per cent of the TEC members were 
replaced, including all but three TEC chairs. In the division/voting station election committees that 
are each responsible for a single voting station, the GEC also reports an equal representation of 
members with affiliation to the two major parties.
5
  
The GEC’s performance is at the heart of making democracy work. If an electoral 
management body builds up a reservoir of support from political elites through its actions, these 
actors learn that they can regain office via electoral competition if they lose at the ballot boxes. 
Thus, the mere experience with competitive elections is self-enforcing. Peaceful turn-overs of 
power and the realization that the world moves on, even that the opposition wins office generally 
lead to greater moderation and dismissal of authoritarian alternatives (Cappocia 2005). This, in turn, 
provides political elites with a longer time-horizon beyond short-term electoral gains. Prolonging of 
political elites’ time perspective spur a more programmatic approach to political reforms that better 
enables the government of the day to broker compromises with the opposition on more radical 
reforms. Thus, the impartiality of the GEC is paramount to political actors’ constructive interaction 
in and between elections. 
 
Access to the ballot and constituency demarcation 
In general, parties and candidates are allowed to register for elections without bias. But there are 
important exemptions to that. The electoral law systematically disqualifies people with special 
competences. People on the salary list of the government, such as civil servants, teachers, and 
doctors are all barred from running unless they resign 6 month prior to the elections. Moreover, 
                                                 
5
 There were a total of 1,704 Division Election Committees and voting stations with 14,162 members 
Nationwide out of which 5,673 were DP affiliates and 5,753 were MPRP affiliates (IRI, 2008: 18). 
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candidates must be 25 years old to run. Thus, qualified people with needed competencies are not 
able to register with a minimum of inconvenience.  
A central feature of access to the ballot is that it is by and large controlled by the political 
parties. To have a chance of winning a seat, candidates must be affiliated with a political party and 
this effectively grants political parties a monopoly on the authority to nominate candidates. This is a 
crucial facet of the rules that contributes to party cohesion and, in turn, regime stability. In every 
election since 1992 not more than three independents have won a seat. Moreover, since 2000 voting 
in parliament is open, enabling parties to better discipline members, and only parties represented in 
parliament can nominate candidates for the presidency.  
On the other hand, a quota for women’s representation has played a role for improving the 
quality of the democratic system. This has ensured a significant number of women’s in parliament 
who have formed a caucus – an unofficial parliamentary group – that has been instrumental in 
putting forward legislation that has advanced policy in important areas. Mongolian’s parliament law 
stipulates that only political parties can form groups within the parliament, thus strengthening party 
cohesion. In 2000, 9 women in parliament formed a caucus that played a leading role in the 
adoption of the law on domestic violence.
6
 In 2012 the women’s caucus got a revival because of the 
revived quota securing 9 women from five different parties a mandate in Parliament. The caucus 
played a central role in pushing for the Law on Gender equality, which was adopted in 2012 shortly 
after the parliament elections, ending long discussions on the issue. In 2015, the caucus pushed for 
improving the quality of maternity hospitals and childcare services, which was adopted into law.
7
  
Recently, there have been some irregularities in the divisions of constituencies in the 
capital Ulaanbaataar. One constituency (Banganuur) was divided into four incoherent districts that 
were then attached to different non-contiguous constituencies. Moreover, 50 constituencies deviates 
                                                 
6
 http://countryoffice.unfpa.org/mongolia/2016/05/26/13848/mongolian_parliament_approves_domestic_violence_law/ 
(consulted 17-08-17). 
7
 http://vom.mn/d/10438 (consulted 17-08-17). 
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more than 15 per cent from the country average number of voters per constituency, which raises 
concerns of gerrymandering (Enkhbaatar et al. 2016, 57). 
Taken together, features of the electoral system support party cohesion. The majoritarian 
based electoral system most frequently used throughout Mongolia’s democratic era favors two 
major political parties, and together with parties’ de facto control of candidate list, open voting in 
parliament, parties’ monopoly on nominating candidates for the presidency and the parties’ 
monopoly on group formation in parliament, these institutional features have contributed to build a 
structured interaction between the political camps in parliament. Such stability inducing 
mechanisms becomes self-enforcing because members of parliament, who seek reelection on a 
favorable party-ticket, must play by some basic rules of the game – i.e., open nomination 
procedures – that encourage sanction of democratic rules of the game.  This, in turn, spurs political 
party coherence and discipline in the party organization that contribute to regime stability, because 
parties are better able to accommodate radical or conservative flanks of the party and retain 
otherwise strong obstacles to democratic rule within the political system while they have a 
structured interaction (Ziblatt 2017). 
Constitutional framework  
In the first democratic constitution from 1992, checks and balances between the parliament and the 
directly elected president gives the president important veto powers, but these were removed with 
comprehensive amendments in 2000 after long-lasting political turmoil.  
During the 1996-2000 parliament period, the MPRP-president rejected three candidates for 
the position as prime minster proposed by the DU-dominated parliament 11 times in total (Da. 
Ganbold was rejected seven times alone) and, thus, dragged on a political stalemate. In the end, the 
only aggregable candidate was first short listed by the President, and then accepted by Parliament. 
Even that J. Narantsatsralt was the MPRP-‘president’s man’, he continued the privatization of state 
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run enterprises and the reforms to free up the market. After less than a year in office, a vote of no-
confidence brought down J. Narantsatsralt, but interestingly his predecessor, R. Amarjargal, kept all 
of J. Narantsatsralt’s government ministers save one. This continuity in government contributed to 
steer out of the political crisis. 
The balance between the president and parliament was, however, changed in 2000, when 
amendments to the constitution reduced the president’s role to a messenger that can consult with the 
prime minster on the composition of the government, but has no say in the final approval of the 
prime minister and her cabinet.  
Now, the president has some prerogatives on foreign policy – she nominates ambassadors 
that are approved by parliament and represent the state in foreign relations – the military, where she 
lead the work of the National Security Council flanked by the speaker of Parliament and the Prime 
Minister who hold a veto option on decision, and is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. 
Moreover, she nominated judges to the constitutional court that are then again approved by 
parliament. The only real appointment power of the president is the Prosecutor General, who is 
appointed for a six year term. The control of this office is important for checks and balances, 
because the Prosecutor General is mandated to raise cases against government officials, including 
members of parliament, for, e.g., charges of corruption.  
Moreover, the president can propose legislation to parliament and veto legislation, but a 
2/3 majority of parliament can override such a veto. Only a parliament decision backed by 2/3 of its 
members can dissolve the house. The president cannot sign decrees herself, but needs the consent of 
the prime minster as well. Thus, the parliament has been the strongest body vis-à-vis the presidency 
since the first democratically enacted constitution, but the 2000 amendments skewed the balance of 
power even more in favor of the prime minister and parliament. The next sections analyses how 
these institutional arrangements affect the interaction between actors in the political system. 
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Table 5: Vote share and Seat allocation in elections for Mongolias People’s Great Assembly (1990) and State Great Assembly (1992-2016) 
Year 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
 Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % 
 430 100.0 76 100.0 76 100.0 76 100.0 76 100.0 76 100.0 72 100.0 76 100.0 
MPRP 358 83.3 70 91.1 25 32.9 72 53.32 36 48.8 45 53 25 34.72 1 4.83 
MoDP (1) 17 3.9 -
c
 -
c
 - - 0 0         
MNPP 6 1.4 -
c
 -
c
 -
d
 -
d
 - -         
MSDP 4 0.9 1 1.3 -
d
 -
d
 0 0         
Alliance - - 4
e
 5.3
e
 - - - -         
DU - - - - 50
f
 65.8
f
 1
g
          
MCUP - - - - 1 1.3 - -         
MDNSP - - - - - - 1 10.95         
PCC - - - - - - 1 1.3         
DP       1 13.35   28 40 31 43.06 9 33.55 
CWP       1 3.45   1 2.3     
MGP           1 2.3     
MPP               65 45.69 
Justice Coal.
j
             11 15.28   
CWGP
i
             2 2.78   
MDC
k
         34 44.9       
RP         1 1.4       
Independents 38 8.8 1 1.3 0 0.0 1 2.92 3 3.5 1 2.3 3 4.17 1 8.12 
Unfilled seat
h
 7 1.6 - - - - - - 2        
Note: ‘%’ refers to vote share in per cent. Sources: TBA. a People’s Great Assembly (First chamber within a bicameral parliament); b Great 
State Hural (unicameral); 
c
 Member of the electoral coalition Alliance; 
d
 Member of the electoral coalition DU; 
e
 The seats for this electoral 
coalition were distributed as follows: MoDP: 2 seats, MNPP: 1 seat, and UP: 1 seat; 
f
 Of the seats for this electoral coalition, the MNDP 
won 35, and the MSDP 15; 
g
 Seat for the MNDP (member of the electoral coalition DU); 
h
 In four constituencies the election results were 
declared invalid, in three constituencies no elections were held. For the corresponding repeated elections held on 31 August 1990, no 
reliable data have been available; 
i
 Civil Will – Green Party was founded in 2011 by two minor parliamentary parties, the Civil Will Party 
(CWP) and the Mongolian Green Party (MGP); 
j
 MPRP-MNDP; 
k
 In February, the Party of Civil Courage, the Democratic Party, and the 
Motherland Mongolian Democratic New Socialist Party agreed to form the MDC coalition. 
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Institutional underpinnings of stable party competition 
The majoritarian based electoral system has produced two partiers that keep one another at bay in a 
structured interaction and with electoral competition that frequently result in turn-overs. In the latest 
election, only 3 out of the 15 parties and alliances running won seats, which imply that the system 
does indeed heavily favor the two big parties. Table 5 shows vote share and seat allocation in 
elections for the parliament from 1990-2016.  
Over the years, the majoritarian system has contributed to produce a viable opposition that 
in turn has been able to check power of the former communist party – a feature that is unlike many 
other East and Southeast Asian countries. As such, the majoritarian system – with the built-in 
features discussed above that favors party cohesion – is a slight blessing for countries striving to 
consolidate democratic rule at the expense of smaller parties that have been structurally disfavored.  
Despite that the majoritarian system has contributed to produce a viable opposition, 
electoral volatility has been high in the 1990s and in the most recent elections in 2016, whereas the 
elections in the 2000s and in 2012 showed a more moderate oscillation. Alternation in power is a 
healthy sign of democratic rule, because it signals that political elites respect the rules of the game. 
However, too much volatility in the composition of the parliament signals that the major parties are 
not aligned with the electorate that switches platform from one election to the other. We want some 
electoral volatility, but not too much, and the landslide victories of the opposition in 1996 and 2016, 
in particular, raises concerns about how institutionalized the party system is.  
Another concern is how votes are converted into seats. In most parliament elections, there 
has been a notable vote-to-seat bias – particularly the use of the block vote has caused concern. In 
the first election in 1992, the former communist party, MPRP, was able to take bundles of votes 
from each of the 35.2 per cent of the voters that supported them resulting in 70 out of the 76 seats in 
the State Great Hural. The move to a pure single-member district system in 1996 produced a similar 
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result, where the newly formed coalition, Democratic Union, won 65.8 per cent of the votes and 
MPRP 32.9 per cent, which awarded them 50 and 25 seats respectively – literally a one to one 
conversion of vote-share to seat-share for both parties. In the 2000 elections, the SMD-system 
produced perhaps the least equal conversion of votes to seats, where MPRP’s 53.3 per cent of votes 
was converted into 72 seats in parliament, whereas DP’s 13.35 per cent of the votes (the second 
largest vote getter) awarded it with only one seat, thus, equaling vote to seat rates of 1.77 and 0.09 
for the two parties respectively. On top of that, the 5 per cent minimum barrier resulted in a loss of 
16 per cent of the total votes cast. The return to the block vote in 2008 resulted in a surprisingly 
equal success rates for the two biggest winners with rates of 1.12 and 0.92, whereas the use of the 
mixed system in 2012 gave a close to equal success rate for the two biggest parties at 0.95. This, 
however, changed in 2016, where DP’s 45.69 per cent of the votes gave the party 65 seats – 
mirroring a very unequal vote-share to seat-share rate of 1.87. 
 
Institutional underpinnings of power sharing 
The Mongolian parliament has seen four turn overs of power in seven elections for parliament 
during the last quarter of a century (in 1996, 2000, 2012 and 2016). All loosing governments have 
accepted defeat and become a constructive player in parliament. In four time periods, the turn overs 
have even produced strong majority-control in parliament and control of the presidency by the same 
party. During 2000-2004 and 2008-2009, the former communist party, MPP was fully in control of 
both bodies, whereas DP was fully in charge during 1996-1997 and 2012-2016. That could be 
alarming signals of democratic derail, but thanks to institutional underpinnings vested in the 
management of elections and features in the constitutional framework these positions have not been 
used to entrench power in line with the trend set by executives in, e.g., Central Asia, Russia, Turkey 
and Venezuela. Moreover, there have been significant turn-overs at the local level – not least in the 
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capital, where power has alternated between the two major parties also dominating politics at the 
national level. 
On top of that, the major parties have come together in times of crisis. In 1992, 2004, 2008 
and 2014, a party in majority formed oversized governments (as opposed to the available minimal 
winning option). After Mongolia’s first democratic elections in 1992, an oversized government was 
formed, seemingly to share the burden of radical economic reforms during the massive economic 
crisis. Moreover, the government formed after the political crisis surrounding the violent 2008-
elections was oversized to unite support among political forces. In 2004, no party was able to form 
government alone, and after a two-month period of political gridlock a grand coalition government 
was formed where legislative and executive posts were split evenly between the three biggest 
parties. In 2014, the DP-prime minister (N.Altankhuyag) and seven ministers were dismissed by 
parliament – initiated by the DP – on charges of corruption. A new government led by DP was 
formed between the major parties to steer out of the political crisis. Against practice, the new prime 
minister was not the leader of the biggest party, who instead was appointed chairman of the 
parliament. In 1992 and 2008, it was the former communist party – with a not so distant past of 
long-time single-party rule – that invited other parties into the oversized government.  
Another sign of power sharing is seen at the committee level of the parliament. The 
parliament can establish a Human Rights Sub-Committee. This sub-committee played an 
instrumental role in solving the political crisis after the 2008-elections. The sub-committee brought 
together central political actors from parliament and civil society as well as citizens in public 
hearings that were paramount to find a solution. Afterwards its independence has been strengthened 
with the selection of an opposition member for the chairmanship in 2009, 2010 and 2015 
(Enkhbaatar et al. 2016, 71–72).  
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Alternations in the presidency have also showed strong signals of rule appliance. Twice 
has a president up for re-election lost the bid and accepted defeat (P. Orchirbart in 1997 and 
N.Enkhbayar in 2009). Moreover, in the most recent presidential run, the two major parties both 
held open internal nominations procedures for candidates. DP elected their candidate through a 
nationwide vote among members after an inclusive dialogue process.
8
  
Between elections, the checks and balance mechanisms are also in place. An overview of 
presidential vetoes shows that the checks and balances in policy-making seem to work as intended. 
From 1994-2013, the president issued a total of 53 vetoes out of which 37 were accepted by 
parliament. The remaining 27.7 per cent of the vetoes were overridden by a 2/3 majority in 
parliament (Enkhbaatar et al. 2016, 103). N. Bagabandi, the MPP-president from 1997-2005 was by 
far the most active veto-player. He did a total of 30 vetoes, half of which were against his own party 
in government, and more than 2/3 of the vetoes were accepted by the government. On the other 
hand, presidents have in general not stood in the way of reforms and they have mostly played a 
constructive role in solving major political crises. 
On the contrary, the relationship between the judicial branch and the legislative is less 
uplifting. On one occasion, the chain of command was respected, when the Speaker of the 
Parliament was removed from office in 2008 after a rule from the constitutional court on 
administrative misconduct. In April 2016 when Parliament reacted swiftly to the constitutional 
courts’ ruling on the unconstitutionality of the proportional elements of the electoral system, the 
order of command was followed but that was after a worrisome removal of the chief judge by 
parliament. The parliaments respect for rulings from the constitutional court has generally not been 
too good. Only one out of three of its conclusions have been accepted by parliament, whereas three 
out of five have been rejected (Enkhbaatar et al. 2016, 173–74). Although the analysis suggests that 
                                                 
8
 http://theubpost.mn/2017/02/01/mp-s-erdene-wins-the-democratic-partys-chairmanship-election/ (consulted 17-08-
17). 
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there are healthy checks and balances in place between the president and parliament, this seems less 
to be the case between the judicial and legislative branches.  
Taken together, the balance of the president and parliament has been a blessing to 
democracy. Few achievers of the third wave of democratization stepped down a democratic 
pathway with such strong legislative powers vis-à-vis the president and this has favored political 
development since. There are strong merits of the division of power and the existence of a 
somewhat strong, but still not-too-strong, president in Mongolia’s semi-presidential system. It has 
helped democracy to have a president who has real balancing powers – such as veto and some 
appointment powers, especially of the judiciary – and the podium of the presidency, but not much 
beyond that. Those factors of checks on power give Mongolia some sort of underlying stability, 
where disagreement never escalate into regime crisis, that animates the military to promote interests 
of political elites. Contrary to the positive effects of a semi-presidential system in Mongolia, 
scholarship on constitutional framework, and particularly semi-presidential systems, often 
emphasize the negative effects of such a system (see, e.g., Moestrup 2004; Elgie 2010). Fights 
between presidents and parliament often lead to stalemate and political crisis. This has plagued 
democracies in Eastern Europe, such as Ukraine, Rumania and Poland, but somewhat surprisingly 
not Mongolia.  
During Mongolia’s relative short experience with democracy, there seems to be rather 
strong institutions underpinning the political system. The fact that an incumbent government party 
has handed over power to the opposition four times in competitive elections, two presidents up for 
re-elections have stepped down upon defeat at the ballot boxes, four oversized government 
coalitions have been formed in times of political crisis, four periods of one-party control in the 
legislature and executive office have not tempted political elites to corrupt power and the president 
and parliament mutually accepts vetoes suggest that a notion of tolerance dominates the political 
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culture in Mongolia. That notion might have been nourished because political elites have learned 
that they have a fair chance of winning elections, can have a say between elections and can find 
together in dialogue and reconciliation in times of political crisis.  
 
Conclusion and implications 
Electoral rules and practices are at the heart of democratic rule. Surprisingly little has been said 
about countries that hold clean elections and has sound political practice between elections, but 
otherwise are characterized by moderate levels of socio-economic development and that are 
surrounded by authoritarian neighbor countries. 
Empirically, this paper has contributed by showing what constitutes free and fair elections 
in East and Southeast Asia, using Mongolia – a top of the form – as an example. Mongolia lacks in 
comparative studies of democratic transition and consolidation, specifically in regional studies of 
East and Southeast Asia as well as the post-Communist world, but also in theoretical work relating 
to electoral malpractice that are mostly selective and limited in scope. This is unfortunate given that 
there is much to learn from such a deviant case of successful democratization.  
This study indicates that rules matter for democratic regime stability. Features of the 
constitutional framework and more particularly electoral rules have been decisive in shoring up a 
structured interaction between political parties and political elites sanction of democratic rule in 
Mongolia even though structural odds have been staged against it. A healthy balance between the 
executive and legislative branch have contribute to build checks and balance into the political 
system and a remarkable spirit of power sharing in parliament have made government parties and 
incumbent presidents accept electoral defeats and the major parties have kept one another at bay 
within a somewhat stable party system between elections just as vetoes have been accepted by each 
branch of the political system. Mongolia’s high electoral integrity indeed corroborate Huntington’s 
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notion that regime stability ‘depends upon the strength of the political organizations and procedures 
in the society’ (1968, 12), but probably also captures what might be a benevolent political culture of 
tolerance for opposing political views. Future work should seek to better understand if similar 
institutional underpinnings bolster democratic regimes in other countries characterized by moderate 
levels of socio-economic development and authoritarian neighbor countries, such as Costa Rica, 
Indonesia, India, Ghana, and Mauritius. 
 
i
                                                 
The author is grateful to XXX for invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this article, and to D. Undrakh for 
facilitating field research in Mongolia. The author is indebted to the people he interviewed in Ulaanbaatar in June-July 
2015 and June-July 2016. They include G. Dondow, S. Ganbaatar, D. Ganbat, R. Gonchigdorj, D. Jargalsaikhan, Brian 
Koontz, D. Munkh-Ochir, H. Naranjargal, S. Oyun, B. Purevjav, E. Sukhbaatar, D. Sukhgerel, L. Sumati, P. Tsetsgee, 
G. Tuvshinzaya, K. Urnukh, Ashleigh Whelan, G. Zandanshatar, and D. Zorigt. 
 
 
28 
 
Bibliography 
Birch, Sarah. 2011. Electoral Malpractice. Comparative Politics. Oxford ; New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Cappocia, Giovanni. 2005. Defending Democracy: Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto, and Beatriz Magaloni. 2001. “Party Dominance and the Logic of Electoral 
Design in Mexico’s Transition to Democracy.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 13 (3): 271–
93. doi:10.1177/095169280101300303. 
Elgie, Robert. 2010. “Semi-Presidentialism, Cohabitation and the Collapse of Electoral 
Democracies, 1990–2008.” Government and Opposition 45 (1): 29–49. doi:10.1111/j.1477-
7053.2009.01303.x. 
Elklit, Jørgen. 1994. “Is the Degree of Electoral Democracy Measurable? Experiences from 
Bulgaria, Kenya, Latvia, Mongolia and Nepal.” In Defining and Measuring Democracy, 
edited by David Beetham, 1st ed., 89–111. Sage Modern Politics Series, v. 36. London ; 
Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications. 
Elklit, Jørgen, and Andrew Reynolds. 2005. “A Framework for the Systematic Study of Election 
Quality.” Democratization 12 (2): 147–162. 
Enkhbaatar, Chimid, Damdinsuren Solongo, Peljid Amarjargal, Tom Ginsburg, Migeddorj 
Batchimeg, Tsegmed Davaadulam, and Odonkhuu Munkhsaikhan. 2016. Assessment of the 
Performance of the 1992 Constitution of Mongolia. Ulaanbaatar: BCI Printing Company. 
Hicken, Allen. 2004. “Asia and the Pacific: General Overview.” In The Handbook of Electoral 
System Choice, 453–474. Springer. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-0-230-
52274-9_26. 
Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Mazzuca, Sebastián L. 2010. “Access to Power versus Exercise of Power Reconceptualizing the 
Quality of Democracy in Latin America.” Studies in Comparative International 
Development 45 (3): 334–357. 
McElwain, Kenneth Mori. 2008. “Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party 
Dominance.” American Journal of Political Science 52 (1): 32–47. doi:10.1111/j.1540-
5907.2007.00297.x. 
Moestrup, Sophia. 2004. Semi-Presidentialsm in Comparative Perspective : Its Effects on 
Democratic Survival. Ann Arbor: UMI. 
Norris, Pippa. 2004. Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. Cambridge, UK ; 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2015. Why Elections Fail. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Norris, Pippa, and Max Grömping. 2017. “Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, (PEI-5.0).” Harvard 
Dataverse. doi:10.7910/DVN/KI5WB4. 
OSCE/ODIHR EOM Mongolia. 2013. “Election Observation Mission Interim Report: Mongolia, 
Presidential Election, 26 June 2013.” 
———. 2016. “MONGOLIA PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, 29 June 2016, OSCE/ODIHR 
Election Observation Mission, Final Report.” 
———. 2017. “International Election Observation Mission To Mongolia, Presidential Election, 26 
June 2017 Statement Of Preliminary Findings And Conclusions.” 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/mongolia/. 
29 
 
Pan, Hsin-Hsin, and Wen-Chin Wu. 2017. “Quality of Governance and Political Legitimacy: 
Governance-Based Legitimacy in East Asia.” Asianbarometer and Globalbarometer, 
Working Paper Series, , no. 121. 
http://asianbarometer.org/publications//96047634fd37cd9b360485a62ea44a56.pdf. 
Remmer, Karen L. 2008. “The Politics of Institutional Change: Electoral Reform in Latin America, 
1978—2002.” Party Politics 14 (1): 5–30. doi:10.1177/1354068807083821. 
Taagepera, Rein. 1997. “The Tailor of Marrakesh: Western Electoral Systems Advice to Emerging 
Democracies.” In Electoral Systems for Emerging Democracies. Experiences and 
Suggestions, edited by Jørgen Elklit, 49–62. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs/Danida. http://escholarship.org/uc/item/7w39027t. 
The International Republican Institute. 2000. “Mongolia Parliamentary Elections July 2, 2000 
Election Observation Mission Final Report.” 
———. 2008. “Mongolia Parliamentary Elections June 29, 2008 Election Observation Mission 
Final Report.” 
Ziblatt, Daniel. 2017. Conservative Political Parties and the Birth of Modern Democracy in 
Europe. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
30 
 
Appendix 
Table 1: Scores on the Varieties of democracy projects clean elections index for Burma/Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and Vietnam from 1989-2016. 
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Table 2: Scores on the Varieties of democracy projects Polyarchy index for Burma/Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and Vietnam from 1989-2016. 
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Table 3. Scores on sub-dimensions of electoral integrity for Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, 
and Vietnam, covering elections during 2014-2016.  
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21 S. Korea Both 74 53 87 63 85 71 55 63 76 92 83 83 
23 Taiwan Pres 73 65 94 65 84 83 61 51 54 94 86 88 
32 Japan Leg 68 55 84 54 75 68 54 58 64 82 78 75 
45 Mongolia Both 64 53 73 57 66 64 55 43 65 88 73 71 
68 Indonesia Both 57 60 62 64 40 65 53 34 56 68 54 67 
83 Myanmar Leg 54 42 72 54 30 40 49 34 56 74 70 69 
94 Singapore Leg 53 27 77 14 77 46 33 35 60 68 75 58 
97 Thailand Leg 52 79 44 71 60 55 47 49 49 64 38 36 
101 Philippines Both 52 56 64 54 34 62 54 23 45 68 52 61 
113 Laos Leg 48 16 67 58 56 40 23 43 45 57 86 38 
142 Malaysia Leg 35 15 43 10 21 48 22 21 56 44 42 32 
147 Vietnam Leg 34 14 41 39 36 27 20 26 41 40 55 35 
149 Cambodia Leg 32 29 38 33 13 38 28 18 35 57 25 28 
Notes: ‘Type’ refers to elections included in the scoring and whether it is presidential (pre), 
legislative (leg) or both. Countries are ordered by rank. Source: Norris and Grömping 2017. 
 
